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Abstract 
 
Social banks are financial intermediaries paying attention to non-economic (i.e. social, 
ethical, and environmental) criteria. To investigate the behavior of social banks on the credit 
market, this paper proposes both theory and empirics. Our theoretical model rationalizes the 
idea that reciprocity can generate better repayment performances. Based on a unique hand-
collected dataset released by a French social bank, our empirical results are twofold. First, we 
show that the bank charges below-market interest rates for social projects. Second, regardless 
of their creditworthiness, motivated borrowers respond to advantageous credit terms by 
significantly lowering their probability of default. We interpret this outcome as the first 
evidence of reciprocity in the credit market.  
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1. Introduction 
Reciprocity in the credit market is a phenomenon whereby borrowers who consider 
themselves fairly treated by the credit institution need no enforcement devices (incentives, 
monitoring, etc.) to repay their debt swiftly. Reciprocity is typically based on trust and 
common values. It can act as a powerful antagonist to perverse mechanisms such as moral 
hazard and strategic default, which are known to plague the functioning of credit markets 
(Jaffee and Rusel, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Brown et al., 2009). However, the 
feasibility for a bank to inspire reciprocity in its borrowers seems to be a challenge, if not an 
illusion. Doubts about this feasibility are especially relevant in the current context where the 
credit crisis has deeply compromised the reputation of the financial sector.  
Still, there is good news. Experimental evidence supports the existence of reciprocity in 
the credit market (Fehr and Zehnder, 2006; Brown and Zehnder, 2007; Cornée et al., 2012). 
Moreover, Karlan (2005) observes that laboratory evidence is often consistent with real-life 
behavior in financial matters. So far, however, no study has ever confirmed the existence of 
reciprocity in real-life credit markets. This paper fills the gap by using a database released by 
a French social bank. To this end, we investigate the bank’s behavior in loan granting and the 
resulting repayment conduct of the borrowers. We show that moral values shared by the bank 
and its motivated borrowers lead to a two-step virtuous mechanism. In the first place, the 
social bank proposes advantageous credit terms to its motivated borrowers. Then, these 
borrowers respond by defaulting less frequently than their standard counterparts. We also 
propose a simple model to rationalize the facts. 
The role of other-regarding preferences in economic decision making has attracted 
increasing attention from scholars over the last twenty years. While there is considerable 
heterogeneity in agents’ attitudes, evidence demonstrates that not everyone maximizes self-

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interest. In particular, a substantial fraction of the population exhibits social preferences. Fehr 
and Schmidt (2003) show that a share of 40% to 60% of the population pursues fairness by 
favoring pro-social outcomes even if this implies forgoing personal gains. Similarly, Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2002) find that a number of people are willing to sacrifice material payoffs to 
reward kind actions or punish unfriendly ones. Socially-minded agents tend to share windfall 
gains in equitable ways even though they stand no chance of benefiting from doing so. They 
also tend to sanction people who split gains unfairly. People with social preferences still care 
for their self-interest, but in addition they exhibit a concern for fairness (Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999) and/or reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Adbulkardiroglu 
and Bagwell, 2013). Experimental evidence indicates that reciprocity is a powerful motivation 
for contract enforceability. This is especially the case when the contract is incomplete and the 
agent’s commitment is unobservable (Fehr et al., 1997; Gächter and Falk, 2004; Brown et al., 
2009).    
More generally, social identity seems to be a driving force for reciprocity. Social 
identity is generally defined as an individual’s sense of self, derived from perceived 
membership of a relevant social group (Chen and Li, 2009). Each individual has several social 
identities stemming among other things from gender, ethnicity, nationality, social class, and 
corporate culture. These more or less salient identities affect attitudes. And they can have 
major implications for economic decisions and outcomes. In the model proposed by Akerlof 
and Kranton (2000), identities are associated with behavioral prescriptions or norms. 
Individuals who deviate from these prescriptions suffer disutility. Interestingly, identities may 
play a crucial role in the case of principal-agent setting with contract incompleteness and 
unobservable effort, such as the lender-borrower relationship. Social identification, i.e. the 
fact that the agent identifies herself with her principal’s values, can mitigate moral hazard 
problems. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) argue that such a phenomenon occurs in employment 


relationships. In addition, social identification fosters reciprocity (Chen and Li, 2009; 
McLeish and Oxoby, 2011). Agents reciprocate more intensively if they identify with 
counterparty to a trade than if they do not.  
In the credit market, borrowers’ reciprocity may thus stem from their social 
identification with the lender. In this regard, social banks offer fertile ground for 
investigation. By nature, social–or ethical–banks pay attention to the non-economic (i.e. 
social and environmental) consequences of their activity (Green, 1989; Taupin and Glémain, 
2007; Benedikter, 2011; Weber and Remer, 2011). These banks pass the financial sacrifices 
of their motivated shareholders and savers through to borrowing firms, which share the social 
values the banks wish to promote. They thus act, at least partly, as drivers of corporate social 
responsibility (Scholtens, 2006) or “philanthropic intermediaries” (Benabou and Tirole, 
2010). Their main goal consists in serving community-oriented projects and social 
enterprises, which put the emphasis not only on financial returns but also–and often chiefly–
on social aims (Defourny, 2001). Even though social banks are still niche institutions, they 
have spread considerably in recent years. Between 2007 and 2010, their asset growth rate 
reached 53.41%, compared with 8.37% for mainstream banking.1 In Europe, their stronghold, 
their combined assets exceeded €20 billion in 2009.2  
Notwithstanding their increasingly popularity and the fact that they represent an 
alternative to conventional banking, evidence on social banks’ operating methods is scant. 
Here we offer two major contributions. First, we set up a simple theoretical model in which 
the interest rate charged by the social bank acts as a credible signal of value-sharing by the 
social bank and a motivated borrower. In this model the borrower's project choice is not 
enforceable by the bank. However, the social bank is ready to invest in a costly screening 
 
1
 Own calculations based on the figures in GABV (2012). 
2
 We refer to the figures of the European Federation of Ethical and Alternative Banks (FEBEA) available on 
www.febea.org.  
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device that allows it to recognize the motivated borrowers, i.e. the ones who share its social 
values. Accordingly, the bank signals their privileged status to these borrowers by offering 
them a low interest rate. Then, in line with their social identity, rationalized by a positive cost 
of cheating, the motivated borrowers reciprocate the bank’s gesture by undertaking an 
efficient investment project with a low default risk.  
Second, we conduct an empirical analysis. We exploit a unique hand-collected dataset 
including detailed information on 389 business loans granted by a French social bank between 
2001 and 2004. Each borrower in our sample is graded on both a social and a financial scale. 
The social bank uses the social rating to measure the degree of proximity between its own 
social identity and that of borrowers. The bank is thus able to identify its motivated 
borrowers. In line with the theoretical model, our empirical results show that the bank charges 
lower interest rates to its motivated borrowers, all else being equal. We also find that these 
borrowers repay more swiftly than others with equal ex ante creditworthiness. We complete 
the study by carrying out a rough cost-benefit analysis of reciprocity. It appears that the 
benefits of reciprocity do not offset the costs associated with both the interest rate rebate and 
social screening.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model on social 
banking and reciprocity. Section 3 introduces our database. Sections 4 and 5 investigate the 
interest rate charged by the bank, and the probability of default, respectively. Section 6 
proposes a cost-benefit analysis of reciprocity. Section 7 offers robustness checks. Section 8 
concludes.   

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2. A Model of Social Banking and Reciprocity  
The recent financial crisis has revealed the limits of mainstream banking and put alternative 
forms of financial intermediation into the spotlight. In particular, social banks characterized 
by a double bottom line have become increasingly popular. Somewhat surprisingly, they 
remain poorly investigated in the academic literature. Accordingly, this section starts with a 
short overview of the sector. Next, it presents a simple model explaining how reciprocity can 
emerge in social banking. 
Beyond their economic function, social banks aim to foster a community of values by 
matching the two sides of financial intermediation: socially-minded investors (i.e. 
shareholders and savers) and motivated borrowers. Social banks are financial intermediaries 
with a double bottom line.3 They advertise social achievements as their main goal. Financial 
concerns are justified by the need for economic sustainability rather than profit maximization 
(Becchetti and Garcia, 2011; Becchetti et al., 2011; San-Jose et al., 2011). In addition, social 
banks are ruled by foundational principles such as transparency, accountability, and fair 
redistribution of profits (Cowton and Thompson, 2000; Cowton, 2002; Bechetti et al., 2011; 
San-Jose et al., 2011).4 
Regarding investment strategy, social banks follow two fundamental rules. First, they 
commit themselves to finance the “real economy.” They grant credit to projects with social 
value added. Second, they ban purely speculative transactions (San-Jose et al., 2011). Their 
financial transactions rely on simple intermediation, and result in high deposits-to-assets and 
 
3
 We henceforth use “social bank” to describe any bank claiming to pay attention to extra-financial criteria, 
regardless of their specific nature, be they social, ethical, or environmental. Arguably, a triple bottom line may 
be advocated (Global Report Initiative, 2011) insofar as social banks often combine ethical and environmental 
concerns. Akin to other works on socially responsible lending (e.g. Gutierrez-Nieto et al., 2011; Allet and 
Hudon, 2013), we consider environmental concern as part of social concerns. Moreover, Norman and 
MacDonald (2004) state that the triple-bottom-line rhetoric may be misleading and act as a smokescreen. 
4
 Becchetti et al. (2011) identify the following foundational principles of social banks: 1) awareness of non-
economic consequences, 2) access to finance as a human right, 3) efficiency and probity, 4) fair redistribution of 
profits, 5) full transparency, 6) encouragement of active involvement of shareholders and savers in decision 
making, and 7) ethical inspiration in all activities. 
	

loans-to-assets ratios. Social banks also differentiate themselves from their commercial 
counterparts by adopting specific corporate governance rules. They favor the involvement of 
stakeholders in strategic and operational decision making (San-Jose et al., 2011). To prevent 
the presence of dominant shareholders, most social banks operate under the legal status of 
cooperatives (GABV, 2012).5 The few that have a capitalistic ownership structure rely on 
self-regulatory arrangements to limit power concentration. For example, shareholders’ voting 
rights at Alternative Bank Schweiz (ABS, Switzerland) and Triodos Bank (The Netherlands 
and Belgium) are capped.6 Alternative forms of stakeholder involvement are promoted, such 
as the participation of non-shareholders in governing and executive bodies.      
How do social banks put their social mission into practice? The stakeholders’ identity-
sharing7 with the bank is essential to capture social banks' operating methods. In line with 
Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) theory, socially-minded investors put their money into a social 
bank in order to receive an extra stream of utility and reinforce their pro-social identity. 
Subsequently, they are ready to forgo a significant part of their financial returns as long as the 
social bank funds motivated borrowers, i.e. borrowers aiming at financing a pro-social 
business project. The intensity of the investors’ social motivation can be measured by their 
financial sacrifice, in other words the spread between the interest paid to them by a social 
bank and by a comparable mainstream bank. Becchetti and Garcia (2011) evaluate this 
sacrifice at Banca Etica, an Italian social bank, at around 150 basis points in 2007. The bank’s 
 
5
 Cooperative status affects not only the design of the institution's governance but also the capital structure of its 
balance sheet. Iannotta et al. (2007) and Ferri et al. (2010) show that financial cooperatives tend to be better 
capitalized than commercial retail banks. Plausibly, this set-up is stronger in social banks. Management can use 
the diffuse ownership structure to easily retain earnings within the bank (Périlleux et al., 2012). This strategy is 
in line with the investors’ commitment to forgo financial returns in exchange for the accomplishment of the 
bank’s social mission. In addition, the cooperative status helps aligning the managers’ behavior with the bank’s 
social mission (Kitson, 1996). Becchetti and Huybrechts (2008) draw the same conclusion for fair-trade 
organizations.   
6
 Each ABS shareholder must remain below the three-percent voting-right threshold. Triodos Bank’s shares are 
held in trust by an ad hoc foundation, whose board is appointed by depository receipt holders with limited voting 
rights. 
7
 We only consider the two key categories of stakeholders: investors (shareholders, savers) and borrowers, and 
disregard other categories such as the staff. Nevertheless, Cornée et al. (2012) show that employees of social 
banks exhibit higher social preferences than their counterparts working in mainstream banks. 
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owners also make sacrifices. San-Jose et al. (2011, p. 152) report that “ethical banks do not 
generally distribute benefits between shareholders and, if at all they do so, the distribution is 
very limited, and profit is, therefore, only residual.”  
Capturing the way social banks operate in the credit market is far more complex for at 
least two reasons. First, as demonstrated by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), in imperfect markets 
with asymmetric information, interest rates will not perform their clearing function. The credit 
market is thus characterized by credit rationing, and the demand side of the market is partially 
unobservable. Second, credit scoring is bank-specific, even for small-business lending alone 
(Cowan and Cowan, 2006). For social banks, the issue is even more acute due to the presence 
of a double bottom line. In addition, the interaction of social and financial missions remains 
poorly elucidated, and stylized facts on credit terms are scarce. In the context of microcredit,8 
Hudon (2007) emphasizes that the level of interest rates is instrumental from an ethical 
standpoint. In our model, the interest rate is the device used by a social bank to signal 
identity-sharing with motivated borrowers.  
Credit allocation is only one side of the problem. To obtain a global picture of how 
social banks’ system of reciprocity operates, we also need to pay attention to the way 
borrowers behave. Typically, asymmetric information prevents the lender from observing the 
borrowers’ actual investment choice. We thus need an alternative rationale for motivated 
borrowers behaving virtuously toward the social bank. In the model proposed by Bariggozzi 
and Tedeschi (2011), a motivated borrower who trades with the social bank perceives an extra 
stream of utility if her project is successful. Therefore, a forward-looking motivated borrower 
is more willing to repay her debt to a social bank than to a profit-maximizing one. In this 
 
8
 Paradoxically, more evidence is available on microfinance institutions active in developing countries than on 
social banks active in developed countries. The existing evidence on microcredit activity is, however, not 
transposable to social banking because the microcredit lending methodology is specific. It is based on the supply 
of standardized small loans without collateral (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). Microfinance institutions 
typically charge identical interest rates to most – if not all – borrowers, and simply tailor loan size to their 
borrowers’ perceived creditworthiness (Agier and Szafarz, 2013a).  
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framework, the borrower’s reaction is dictated by the nature of the social bank, not by a 
signal. In the real world, however, borrowers constitute a heterogeneous set of agents. They 
need a credible signal to realize that they belong to the bank’s privileged clientele. Once a 
borrower has learned about her privileged status, she might wish to reciprocate the gesture by 
making an efficient investment with a low default risk. In our model, this mechanism is 
rationalized by introducing the cost of cheating, which is incurred by motivated borrowers 
only. 
Let us now present our model. Consider a social bank active in a competitive credit 
market with two types of borrowers: opportunistic and motivated. A social bank differs from 
a mainstream bank in the way it screens loan applicants. Its goal is to target motivated 
borrowers and offer them fair credit terms. To do so, the social bank pays the extra costs 
associated with its social screening mechanism. In practice, screening is based on an 
evaluation of the applicants’ motivation. As a result, the social bank is able to recognize 
motivated borrowers. These borrowers share an identity with the social bank, and this makes 
them reluctant to cheat on their project choice. Parameter c denotes the (positive) cost of 
cheating for motivated borrowers.9 In contrast, opportunistic borrowers face zero cost of 
cheating. We assume that the social bank not only observes the type of each borrower but also 
correctly estimates parameter c.  
In line with Fehr and Zehnder (2006), we assume that all the borrowers are risk-neutral 
and have the choice between two projects. First, project A is an efficient low-risk project 
yielding return  with probability and zero return with probability  . Second, 
project B is an inefficient high-risk project yielding return 	AB C with probability 
 
9 Actually, our model includes a homogenous group of opportunistic borrowers (zero cost of cheating) and a 
continuum of motivated borrowers characterized by their degree of motivation, defined by their cost of cheating.  

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	D  and zero return with probability  	. Borrowers have limited liability: The 
repayment of a loan cannot exceed the return on the project. 
All the loans have the same size, normalized to one. Each borrower applies for the 
financing of a given project (A or B), but asymmetric information makes it impossible for the 
bank to enforce the undertaking of the announced project. The social bank is a price-taker. 
The market interest rates are Eon project A and E	on project B, with E	 B E. We assume 
that: 
	 F	    E   F    E  	 F	    E	,   (1) 
which implies that ex ante the borrowers are better off applying for project A and undertaking 
it than applying for project B and undertaking it. Therefore, no borrower will ever apply for a 
loan by announcing project B. However, once the loan is released, the choice of project is 
private information to the borrower and cannot be enforced by the bank. As a result, 
opportunistic borrowers will apply for credit with project A but will subsequently undertake 
project B. Since the social bank observes the type of each borrower, it will charge rate E	 to 
opportunistic borrowers. 
In contrast, motivated borrowers face a trade-off: Either they announce project A and 
subsequently undertake project A, or they announce project A but then cheat and undertake 
project B. In the first case, their expected profit is  F    E, where r is the interest 
rate charged by the bank. In the second, the expected profit is 	 F	    E  . More 
precisely, a motivated borrower will undertake project A if: 
 F    E B 	 F	    E  , 
or equivalently if: 


		   D     	  E       (2) 
Hence, the project choice of the motivated borrowers depends on the interplay between 
the interest rates,Eand E	, and the cost of cheating, c. According to Eq. (2), we have three 
possibilities: 
(i) c is high: 		   D     	  E D     	  E	 
(ii) c is moderate:     	  E D 		   D     	  E	 
(iii) c is low:     	  E D     	  E	 D 		   
In the two polar cases, (i) and (iii), the behavior of the motivated borrowers does not 
depend on the interest rate charged. In case (i), cheating is very costly and the borrowers will 
undertake project A. Since the bank estimates the value of c correctly, it knows that the 
announcement of project A is trustworthy. Therefore, it will charge rate E In case (iii), the 
cost of cheating is low enough to make the borrowers cheat regardless of the interest rate 
charged by the bank. Accordingly, the informed bank will charge rate E	 Motivated 
borrowers facing a low cost of cheating behave like their opportunistic counterparts. 
The situation depicted in case (ii) is more interesting. The decision of motivated 
borrowers facing moderate cheating costs depends on the rate charged by the bank. If the 
bank charges rate E, the borrower will not cheat and undertake project A. Alternatively, if the 
bank charges rate E	, cheating becomes more profitable than being trustworthy, and the 
borrowers will undertake project B. Remarkably, in case (ii) the social bank determines the 
borrowers’ project choice even though the bank can neither observe nor enforce it.  
To further interpret the findings of the model, let us compare the situations of standard 
and social banks. A standard bank shares no identity with its borrowers. Hence, it charges all 
of them E	, and ends up financing inefficient high-risk projects only. In contrast, by sharing 

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an identity with some of its borrowers, namely the motivated ones, the social bank manages to 
finance efficient low-risk projects. It does so by charging rate E to borrowers facing moderate 
or high cheating costs. Actually, these borrowers know that they are privileged by the bank 
because they are charged E rather thanE	. In the real life, borrowers perceive this credible 
signal when negotiating the credit terms.     
In practice however, identifying motivated borrowers and estimating their individual 
cost of cheating can prove very costly for the social bank. This may explain why social banks 
are ultimately less profitable than standard ones. In the framework of our empirical study, we 
interpret the social rating (SR) as an estimate of the cost of cheating. This follows from the 
intuition that for a borrower, higher motivation entails a higher cost of cheating a social bank. 
Moreover, the model shows that among the motivated borrowers, those with a high value of c 
will never cheat while others, with a moderate value of c, will refrain from cheating only if 
the bank signals its confidence by charging rate E. In this case, the signal will generate 
reciprocity in the form of undertaking project A. 
Overall, the message from our model is that social banks serving, at least partly, 
motivated borrowers end up with a less risky loan portfolio than do standard banks, and thus 
obtain better repayment performances. They also enhance global welfare by increasing the 
share of efficient low-risk projects in the economy. Nevertheless, given the additional 
screening costs faced by social banks, the overall differences in profitability between standard 
and social banks remain ambiguous. We will further explore this issue in Section 5.   
  

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3. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
The hand-collected data used in this study come from La Nef,10 a French social bank 
established in 1988. San-Jose et al. (2011) list La Nef among the social banks that best align 
their managerial deeds with their ethical principles. La Nef is a financial cooperative operating 
throughout France under the supervision of Banque de France, the French central bank. With 
27,135 members in 2010, it had total assets amounting to €288 million. La Nef implements 
basic intermediation rules. Its resources come from the savings11 of cooperative members, 
who are motivated by social returns. This motivation is testified by financial returns lying 
slightly above inflation (La Nef’s annual report, 2010), which is consistent with the financial 
sacrifice of 150 basis-points mentioned by Becchetti and Garcia (2011) for Banca Etica. La 
Nef is committed to transparency, publishing details of its investments every year. This 
constitutes a channel for direct relationships between savers and borrowers.   
Our study stretches from 2001 to 2008. We consider loans granted over the 2001-2004 
period. In addition, we use a four-year window (2005-2008) to record the occurrences of 
default.12 During the 2001-2004 period, La Nef operated three branches,13 and its clientele 
was spread all over France (see Table A1 in Appendix A).14 Loans are extended to borrowers 
in rural areas (50.41%), town and cities (25.07%), and suburbs (24.52%). This geographic 
dispersion is linked to the diversity of activities funded by La Nef. The pool of borrowers is 
mainly composed of small businesses, community-oriented project holders, and social 
enterprises. Over the 2001-2004 period, the bank granted 630 loans. Only 476 of them were 
 
10
 See www.lanef.com. 
11
 In 2010, its deposits-to-assets ratio was 85.92% and its loans-to-assets ratio was 40.12%, which is quite low. 
However, the resources not directly used for loans are entrusted to Le Crédit Coopératif, a partner cooperative 
bank sharing La Nef’s social values. In 2010, this represented 35.76% of the balance sheet (La Nef, 2010). 
12
 The data were collected in November 2008. The sample period for loan granting stretches from January 1, 
2001 to November 25, 2004. The November 2004-November 2008 period is used only as a feedback period. 
13
 Since September 2007, La Nef has operated four branches. 
14
 The Ile-de-France, Provence-Alpes-Côtes-d’Azur and Rhône-Alpes regions are overrepresented since they 
include the three largest French cities: Paris, Marseille and Lyon, respectively.

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effectively extended. We managed to gain access to the complete credit files for 389 extended 
loans, which gives our sample 81 percent representativeness. Missing files are proportionately 
less frequent in the second half of the sample period (see Table 1), due to improvements in the 
bank’s information system.15  
Table 1: Sample Yearly Composition 
Year Extended loans  Observed loans  Representativeness 
2001 87 50 57.47% 
2002 106 84 79.25% 
2003 143 129 90.21% 
2004 140 126 90.00% 
Full sample 476 389 81.72% 
 
The borrowers are relatively young businesses (5.34 years old, on average) and include 
49% of start-ups. Average turnover is about €540,000, and the average number of employees 
is 7.59. These companies operate in four sectors: environmental protection and ecology 
(46%), fair trade and community-based services (30%), culture and health (12%), economic 
inclusion and microfinance (12%). Regarding legal status, 43.5% are unlimited companies, 
37.5% are limited companies, and 19% are cooperatives.16All the loans are pledged with 
collateral. The average level of collateralization is equal to 84%, in line with the figures for 
mainstream banking (see Becchetti and Garcia, 2011). This, however, contrasts with the 42% 
of uncollateralized loans reported by Becchetti and Garcia (2011) for Banca Etica. The 
difference is likely attributable to the fact that Banca Etica trades with borrowers belonging to 
consortiums. Hence, existing long-term relationships between these consortiums and the bank 
 
15
 Most likely, our sample does not suffer from a selection bias. The missing loans were excluded by accident, 
not on purpose. Unfortunately, we had no access to information on the denied applications. This in turn limits 
the possibility of observing the bank's full selection process.   
16
 Due to data unavailability, some statistics have been obtained from reduced samples. Location and loan 
officers are known for 367 firms, age and firm status for 369, and turnover and staff for 55.  
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act as a substitute for collateral, even though the consortiums themselves provide no formal 
guarantee for the loans.  
Table 2 presents the variables used in the empirical study, broken down into four 
categories. First, each borrower is characterized by a financial rating (FIN) and a social 
responsibility rating (SR). These ratings are established in-house by the loan officers who 
systematically pay a visit to the applicants.  
Both ratings are given on a one-to-three scale, three being the best grade. The FIN 
rating gives a general appraisal on both backward-looking and forward-looking perspectives. 
It assesses 1) business risks and prospects, 2) financial statements, and 3) profitability. Since 
the bank’s clientele includes a large share of start-ups, this approach is more relevant to its 
practice than the conventional backward-looking point-in-time measure used to evaluate 
bankruptcy risks (Grunert et al., 2005). 
The SR rating assesses the foreseen social and environmental accomplishments of the 
project. This rating is assigned in two steps. The credit officer who meets up with the credit 
applicant on the spot makes the first appraisal. Then, the credit committee makes the final 
decision according to guidelines provided by the so-called ethics committee appointed by the 
board of the bank. In contrast to FIN, SR is not determined according to strict rules. Rather, it 
involves judgments on non-tangible characteristics, such as moral rectitude, social motivation, 
the ethicality and environment-friendliness of the business activity, and corporate 
responsibility towards stakeholders. These characteristics can be interpreted as an assessment 
tool for the proximity between the applicant’s and the bank’s social identities. La Nef’s 
Annual report (2006) sets out the assessment guidelines. “SR = 1” means that granting the 
loan would favor financial inclusion, i.e. no special characteristics are necessary for the 
applicant; “SR = 2” means the applicant is concerned with environmental or social 
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responsibility; “SR = 3” means the applicant is concerned with environmental and social 
responsibility.  
Second, the three contractual features of the loans are: charged interest rate (RATE), 
loan size in €10,000 (LOANSIZE), and share of the loan that is not collateralized 
(NONCOLLAT). These features are set by the bank. 
Third, as in previous studies (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Elsas 
and Krahnen, 1998), for each loan we have collected the same-day three-month Paris Inter 
Bank Offered Rate (PIBOR3M), which proxies the bank’s refinancing rate.  
Table 2: Variables in the Database  
 
VARIABLES DEFINITIONS 
Financial and social ratings 
FIN Financial rating: from 3 (excellent) to 1 (distress) 
SR Social responsibility rating: from 3 (best) to 1 (worst) 
Contractual features 
RATE Nominal rate at which the loan is granted (100 basis points) 
LOANSIZE Amount extended in €10,000 
NONCOLLAT Share of the loan unpledged by collateral (in %) 
Refinancing interest rate 
PIBOR3M Three-month Paris Inter Bank Offered Rate (100 basis points) 
Additional characteristics 
STARTUP = 1 if the loan is extended to a start-up; 0 otherwise 
RELATIONSHIP = 1 if the firm had a banking relationship prior to loan approval; 0 
otherwise 
DEFAULT = 1 if the firm defaults within the four years after loan extension; 0 
otherwise 
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Fourth, three dummy variables account for the borrowing firm being a start-up (STARTUP), 
having a banking relationship prior to loan extension (RELATIONSHIP), and having 
experienced a default within the four years following loan extension, respectively. The first 
two characteristics are observed by the bank when determining credit condition; the third is 
observed ex post.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by Social Responsibility Levels 
Sample Full sample  
(n = 389) 
SR = 1  
(n = 74)  
  
SR = 2  
(n = 174) 
SR = 3  
(n = 141) 
and t-tests for equal 
means w.r.t. SR = 1 
and t-tests for equal 
means w.r.t. SR = 2 
  
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
FIN 1.97 0.02 1.89 0.04 1.99* 0.03 1.99 0.04 
RATE (in %) 5.87 0.03 6.09 0.07 5.94* 0.04 5.67*** 0.06 
LOANSIZE 
(in €10,000) 4.68 0.23 3.15 0.32 4.53*** 0.34 5.67** 0.44 
NONCOLLAT 
(in %) 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.15    0.01 0.17 0.01 
PIBOR3M 
(in %) 2.70 0.03 
      
STARTUP 0.48 0.02 0.68 0.05 0.49*** 0.03 0.36** 0.04 
RELATIONSHIP 0.17 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.17** 0.02 0.22 0.03 
DEFAULT 0.23 0.02 0.39 0.05 0.24** 0.03 0.14** 0.02 
*: equality rejected with p < 10%, **: equality rejected with p < 5%, ***: equality rejected with p < 1% 
 
Table 3 gives an overview of the whole sample as well as figures averaged within fixed 
SR levels, and tests for differences across these levels. It appears that 18% of the funded 
projects have a low SR rating (SR = 1), 44% have a mid-range one (SR = 2), and 38% have a 
high one (SR = 3). In line with its mission, the bank favors socially oriented projects, but its 
portfolio is not restricted to high-SR projects. This may be attributable to diversification 
motives and/or scarcity of such projects.17  
The yearly interest rate charged by the bank is 5.87% on average, while the average 
refinancing rate (PIBOR3M) is 2.70% over the period. The average loan size is €46,800. In 
 
17
 The relatively low loans-to-assets ratio (40.12%) may derive from a scarcity of social projects that break even.  
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line with the bank’s social mission, the interest rate charged is negatively related to SR, while 
loan size is positively related to it. Collateralization, in contrast, is insensitive to SR, since the 
non-collateralized share of the loans varies little (between 15% and 17%). Most importantly, 
the social and financial ratings seem weakly related.  
Table 3 indicates that the share of start-ups decreases with SR. Startups represent 83% 
of the firms with SR = 1, but only 57% of those with SR = 2, and 40% of those with SR = 3. 
One possible explanation lies in the bank’s prudence in assessing SR for start-ups. 
Information asymmetries are evidently high for start-ups. This evidence points to the 
necessity of taking the start-up status explicitly into account in the regression analysis. In the 
same vein, benefitting from a relationship with the bank increases the likelihood of reaching 
higher SR, but this effect is significant only for the transition from SR = 1 to SR = 2.  
A full 23% of the borrowing firms experienced repayment issues within the four-year 
period following loan extension. These issues, grouped under the “default” denomination, are: 
moratoriums, loan provisions, credit withdrawals, disposal of collateral, and liquidation. This 
broad definition of default is consistent with the recommendation issued by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (Second Consultative Document, 2001, recommendation 
272). Based on out-of-sample figures from 2007, we estimate that around 15% of the 
defaulted loans are eventually liquidated. According to this estimate, only 3.5% of the bank’s 
loan portfolio would end up in liquidation. Expectedly, defaults are more frequent for start-
ups (32%) than for existing firms (14%). Based on 2007 data, we estimate that liquidation 
concerns about 2% of the loans extended to existing companies and about 5% to start-ups. 
Default occurrences decrease sharply with SR. Passing from SR = 1 to SR = 3 lowers the 
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probability of default from 0.39 to 0.14.18 This key figure will be further explored in Section 
5.  
On the whole, the descriptive statistics reveal that high-SR firms get lower interest rates 
and higher loan sizes, which is consistent with the bank's stated social orientation. At this 
stage, however, we cannot exclude that credit conditions are also determined by other factors 
interacting with SR. 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix: All Firms 
  SR FIN RATE LOANSIZE 
NON 
COLLAT STARTUP 
RELATIO
NSHIP 
SR 1.00 
      
FIN 0.05 1.00 
     
RATE -0.27*** -0.12** 1.00 
    
LOANSIZE 0.19*** 0.05 -0.25***p 1.00 
   
NONCOLLAT -0.00 -0.08* -0.18***p 0.07p 1.00 
  
STARTUP -0.22*** -0.05 0.06 -0.24* 0.15*** 1.0000 
 
RELATIONSH
IP 0.13*** 0.17*** -0.14*** 0.02 -0.00 -0.36*** 1.0000 
DEFAULT -0.20*** -0.14*** 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.21*** -0.15*** 
Subscript “p” means Pearson correlations, the other correlations are Spearman rank correlations.  
*: zero correlation rejected with p < 10%, **: zero correlation rejected with p < 5%, ***: zero correlation rejected with p < 1%  
 
Social banks can support motivated borrowers in at least two ways. First, they can help 
social firms otherwise redlined by profit-oriented credit providers. Second, they can provide 
below-market credit conditions, such as low interest rates, to profitable projects in order to 
increase the chances of success. While these two strategies may be combined, their practical 
consequences are dramatically different. In the first case, the social bank acts as a substitute 
for public subsidy, and launches social but unprofitable activities. In the second, it acts as a 
profit accelerator for already well-performing social firms, a target mostly disregarded by 
public funding schemes. To empirically disentangle these strategies, we use the correlation 
between the financial and social ratings of the selected projects.  
 
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 Loan-loss provisioning is governed by law. Therefore, we rule out the possibility that loans with different 
social ratings are treated differently by the bank.       
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Table 4 gives the correlation matrix. The most important figure concerns the correlation 
between the social and financial ratings. Because our sample is made up of granted loans 
only, it is subject to an endogenous selection bias. Assuming that the pool of applicants is 
large enough to let the bank make a meaningful selection, we view the correlation between 
the two ratings as a consequence of the selection mechanism. Accordingly, a negative 
correlation in our sample would signal that the selection is less stringent for motivated 
borrowers than for standard ones. In contrast, a positive correlation would be incompatible 
with the bank’s social mission.19  
Table 4 reveals that the correlation between the two ratings is not significantly different 
from zero. We interpret this key figure as the consequence of a selection mechanism that is 
not biased towards high SR ratings. In particular, this is consistent with the bank using a 
financial-based denial rule, such as rejecting below-break-even projects. This type of rule is 
frequent in mainstream banking. In social banking, it is often combined with a similar rule 
rejecting projects with below-standard social ratings. What matters from our standpoint is that 
the social rating is not used to mitigate the importance of the financial rating in the selection 
phase. As a consequence, we rule out the possibility that the bank is softer on social projects. 
The social bank does not target social projects with low profitability. Rather, it seems 
concerned with enhancing the probability of success of viable social projects. By 
concentrating on profitable projects, the social bank acts as a complement to public funding 
schemes rather than a substitute for them.  
Table 4 also indicates that the interest rate exhibits significantly negative correlations 
with both ratings, social and financial. Low interest rates tend to be associated with large 
 
19
 Admittedly, this argument would be stronger if we had access to data on denied loans, which is unfortunately 
not the case. Instead, we rely here on the assumption that the loan selection is made within a pool of applications 
large enough to allow the bank to make unconstrained choices. Although this assumption is debatable, we see no 
realistic scenario that would make the observed zero correlation spurious.  
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loans, high collateralization, and existing banking relationship. The latter finding is consistent 
with empirical studies suggesting that the cost of credit decreases as a function of the intensity 
of the banking relationship (Berger and Udell, 1995; Uzzi, 1999; Berger et al., 2007).  
Start-ups tend to face lower collateral requirements. This striking correlation may be 
explained by the fact that, in France, loans to start-ups are often secured by public guarantee 
funds. In all, 69.02% of start-up loans are guaranteed by public collateral (41.68% of total 
loans).20 Public collateral is highly reliable because it is automatically released when loans are 
liquidated. As a result, the bank needs proportionately less public than private 
collateralization to reach a given level of guarantee.  
The zero correlation between RELATIONSHIP and NONCOLLAT in Table 4 is 
counter-intuitive. A large body of empirical studies strongly supports the argument that 
relationship lending reduces collateral requirements (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and 
Udell, 1995; Boot, 2000; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Chakraborty and Hu, 2006). In 
our sample, though, the raw correlation may be flawed by ignoring the STARTUP factor, 
which is correlated positively with NONCOLLAT and negatively with RELATIONSHIP. 
The regression analysis will confirm that the apparent anomaly disappears when the start-up 
status is properly accounted for. 
Unlike previous studies (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Elsas and 
Krahnen, 1998), we use the charged interest rate (RATE) and the refinancing rate 
(PIBOR3M) as two distinct variables (see Table 2), instead of focusing solely on their 
difference–the spread. This choice is motivated by the joint movements of the variables at 
stake. Fig. 1 draws the dynamics of three variables: RATE, PIBOR3M, and the spread. From 
2001 to 2004, RATE steadily decreased, roughly following PIBOR3M. Over the same period, 
 
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 These percentages are obtained from a sub-sample of 367 firms.  
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the spread experienced a dramatic shift, widening from 2.40% in 2001 to 3.39% in 2003.21 
This shift may result from the use of a rate-smoothing strategy. In periods of downtrending 
market interest rates, banks tend to charge higher spreads in order to rebuild their margins 
(Machauer and Weber, 1998). Conservatively, we have decided to work with both the RATE 
and PIBOR3M variables, the former being a dependent variable, the latter an independent 
one. The resulting econometric specifications are more flexible than those built from the 
spread only.22  
Figure 1: Charged Interest Rate, Refinancing Rate (PIBOR3M), and Spread  
 
 
4. Impact of Social Rating on Interest Rate 
In this section, we examine how the social rating influences the interest rate that the social 
bank charges its borrowers. The social rating is our focus because this is what makes social 
banks special among credit providers. In the empirical literature, little is known about the way 
 
21
 The overall evolutions of the FIN and SR variables are stable. This excludes the possibility for the shift in 
spreads being driven by a change in the composition of the clientele.  
22
 We have also estimated a model explaining the spread. The estimation results are similar to those in Table 5 
(Section 4), regarding signs, amplitudes, and levels of significance. However, explaining the spread rather than 
the interest rate is detrimental to the quality of fit. 
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social characteristics affect the interest rates charged by social banks. We investigate this 
issue through regression analysis.  
Table 5 presents the results for four specifications explaining the interest rate. In 
specification (1), the main explanatory variables are the social (SR) and financial (FIN) 
ratings. The benchmark interest rate (PIBOR3M) is added to account for the bank’s 
refinancing rate. This specification makes sense if one assumes that all the borrowers’ 
characteristics are well summarized by the two ratings. Specification (2) takes explicitly into 
consideration the two variables related to informational asymmetries, namely STARTUP and 
RELATIONSHIP. These variables are included because the borrowers know more about the 
characteristics of their own projects than the lender does. Specification (3) adds loan size and 
collateralization. These two variables interact with the interest rate, as shown by the 
correlation matrix in Table 4. However, including them as explanatory variables might raise 
an endogeneity issue because the three credit conditions (interest rate, loan size, and 
collateralization) are simultaneously determined. To address this issue, we also estimate a 
multivariate model for the three credit terms (see Table C1 in Appendix C). The estimates 
obtained from the multivariate regression are similar to those from the univariate regressions 
for the interest rate.  
In specification (4), year dummies account for incomplete–and subsequently excluded–
files, which are proportionately more frequent during the first year of observation. Besides, 
the global economic climate might also have influenced both the bank's lending strategy and 
the creditworthiness of its borrowers. Allowing for year effects is a way to correct for biases 
potentially introduced by these two facts. Specification (4) also controls for loan officers, who 
play a crucial role in SR measurement. However, complete information on loan officers is 
available for only a sub-sample of 367 firms. Therefore, specification (4) is estimated on a 
reduced sample. 
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Table 5: Interest Rate: OLS Estimations  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES RATE RATE RATE RATE 
        
 
SR -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.08** 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
FIN -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.15*** 
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) 
PIBOR3M 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.59*** 0.42*** 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.091) 
STARTUP 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.049) 
RELATIONSHIP -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
(0.066) (0.065) (0.063) 
LOANSIZE -0.02*** -0.02*** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
NONCOLLAT -0.15 -0.15 
(0.146) (0.145) 
CONSTANT 4.86*** 4.84*** 4.99*** 5.39*** 
(0.140) (0.148) (0.152) (0.407) 
Year dummies No No No Yes 
Loan officer dummies No No No Yes 
Observations 389 389 389 367 
R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.61 
*: significant at the 10% level, **: significant at the 5% level, ***: significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 5 shows that, in all specifications, both the social and the financial ratings 
influence the charged interest rate negatively. Specification (2) shows that STARTUP and 
RELATIONSHIP have no direct impact on the determination of the interest rate. The R-
squared obtained for Specification (3) is hardly affected by the inclusion of loan size and 
collateralization. Still, the load of loan size is significantly negative. This could indicate that 
social banks favor larger loans. 
As expected, higher financial ratings are valued in terms of lower interest rates. More 
interestingly, social firms get cheaper credit from the bank, all other things being equal. The 
bank's social orientation results in interest rate rebates to social firms. This rebate is 
interpreted as a social premium. More precisely, a one-unit increase in the social rating is 
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associated with an eight to sixteen basis-point premium in the charged interest rate.23 
Qualitatively speaking, this result confirms the findings of the theoretical model that the 
social bank charges a lower interest rate to borrowers exhibiting higher motivation.  
 
5. Social Rating and Probability of Default 
In this section, we study the reactions of motivated borrowers who benefit from a social 
premium. To check whether the social premium influences repayment performance, we use 
the information on defaults. A loan is said to be defaulted if the borrower experiences 
reimbursement issues during the four years after the loan was granted.24  
In Table 6, we estimate the probability of default through probit estimations25 under 
several specifications, for the sake of robustness. In specification (1), only the social and 
financial ratings are used to explain default probability. Specification (2) controls for the two 
variables associated with asymmetric information. Specification (3) also includes the credit 
conditions. Last, specification (4) takes into account year and loan-officer dummies.   
Table 6 reports the marginal effects at the mean. There is overwhelming evidence of 
significantly negative impacts of both the social and the financial ratings on default 
probability. Interestingly, these two effects share similar sizes in all specifications. This is 
confirmed by formal tests for equal coefficients. While the negative impact of the financial 
rating on default probability was expected, that of the social rating was not, especially since 
both ratings are uncorrelated. Moreover, both effects are far from negligible. An additional 
unit of any rating brings around a 10% decrease in the probability of default. 
 
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 The loading of SR in specification (4) is lower than in the previous specifications. Presumably, this is because, 
unlike FIN ratings, the SR ratings are determined somewhat subjectively by loan officers.  
24
 The loans are extended for periods varying from one to twenty years. This four-year convention, fixed by the 
bank, is thus somewhat arbitrary. Still, 87% of defaults occur within the four years following credit granting. 
25
 Logit estimations (not reported) bring similar results.  
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Table 6: Probability of Default: Probit Estimations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT 
         
SR -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.10*** 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
FIN -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.11** 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
STARTUP 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.11** 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.047) 
RELATIONSHIP -0.09 -0.10 -0.10* 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.055) 
RATE -0.02 -0.01 
(0.034) (0.051) 
LOANSIZE 0.00 0.00 
(0.005) (0.005) 
NONCOLLAT -0.01 0.06 
(0.154) (0.162) 
Year dummies No No No Yes 
Loan officer dummies No No No Yes 
Observations 389 389 389 367 
Log (L) -199.22 -191.60 -191.15 -180.64 
The table reports marginal effects at the mean.  
*: significant at the 10% level, **: significant at the 5% level, ***: significant at the 1% level. 
 
There are two possible explanations for the impact of the social rating on default 
probability. First, higher ratings encourage significant rebates in interest rates. This 
automatically decreases the borrower’s financial burden and makes the loans easier to 
reimburse. This “rational” explanation is, however, contradicted by the estimation of 
specification (3), which controls for credit conditions in general, and interest rates in 
particular. None of the credit conditions has a significant direct influence on the probability of 
default. In addition, the financial benefits associated with interest rate rebates are modest 
given the historically low levels of rates over the study period.  
The second, more convincing explanation involves a reciprocity effect driven by 
favorable credit conditions acting as a signal. This is the gist of our theoretical model. The 
results in Table 6 demonstrate that motivated borrowers virtuously respond to fair credit 
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conditions by increasing the effort they put into meeting their financial obligations to the 
social lender. Accordingly, our estimations provide the first empirical confirmation of the 
intuition that reciprocity exists in credit markets, posited by Fehr and Zehnder (2004) and 
Brown and Zehnder (2007) and formalized in our model. 
Still, we cannot rule out that at least some motivated borrowers exhibit a lower 
probability of default regardless of the interest rate rebate they receive. In our theoretical 
model, the borrowers with a high cost of cheating do not need a signal to undertake an 
efficient low-risk project. However, even in that situation the social bank supplies them with 
the fair interest rate corresponding to the risk level of their actual project. Similarly, one could 
imagine that some of La Nef's motivated borrowers would spontaneously make a greater 
effort to fulfill their project than would their same-creditworthiness opportunistic 
counterparts. This could simply be due to the fact that they are dealing with a social bank. If 
this is the case, the interest rate rebate is a “pure gift” from the bank, stemming from a shared 
social identity. Empirically, “pure gift” and reciprocity are impossible to disentangle because 
they appear to be observationally equivalent. 
It could even be that motivated borrowers are more concerned with fulfilling their 
projects than are other borrowers regardless of the financing institution. They would then 
exhibit good repayment performances in relation to any bank, social or not. One could object 
to the argument that if socially-responsible borrowers were systematically more trustworthy 
than opportunistic ones, then banks would have learned this from experience. As a result, 
assessing social responsibility would have become part and parcel of standard financial 
assessment. In practice, this is obviously not the case. Conversely, it is generally very difficult 
to obtain financial support from mainstream banks for social projects. This fact is actually the 
very reason for the emergence of social banks.  
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6. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Reciprocity  
To gauge the economic impact of reciprocity for a social bank, we sketch a cost-benefit 
evaluation of La Nef’s socially-oriented lending policy. The net benefit of reciprocity in year 
t, , is the difference between the benefit of reciprocity and its costs. The benefit stems 
from the decrease in default occurrences. The costs are twofold. First, motivated borrowers 
receive social premiums, which result in lower interest cashed in by the bank. Second, the 
social bank faces specific costs associated with social screening.  is thus computed in 
the following way: 
              (3) 
where  is the year-t reduction in the cost of default driven by the virtuous repayment 
conduct of motivated borrowers,  is the year-t reduction in cashed-in interests stemming 
from social premiums offered to motivated borrowers, and  represents the year-t screening 
costs associated with assessing the applicants’ social ratings.  
Evaluating the components of  is an arduous task entailing the possibility of 
significant measurement errors. Here, we outline the basic assumptions, while providing 
technical details in Appendix B. When discounting is needed, we use a 6% rate corresponding 
to a rough estimate of the bank’s weighted average cost of capital.26  
First, to estimate  we use the bank’s loan-loss provisions (LLPs), which reflect the 
expectations of future losses on defaulted loans.27 To derive the share of LLPs attributable to 
the bank's social orientation, we need a benchmark. Hence, we introduce a hypothetical non-
social bank serving the same clientele as La Nef. This benchmark bank is assumed to grant 
 
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 Sensitivity analysis reveals that variations in this parameter have little effect on the estimates of the  's. 
27
 Loans in default are non-performing loans at least 90 days in arrears. Actually, LLP can also be manipulated 
strategically. For instance, banks have incentives to use provisions to manage earnings and regulatory capital as 
well as to signal information about future prospects (Ahmed et al., 1999). Nevertheless, working with 
differential—rather than absolute—costs likely offsets any strategic biases. 
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credit in the same way that La Nef treats its clients, with SR = 1. Doing so neutralizes the 
effects of reciprocity embedded in granting advantageous conditions to borrowers with SR = 
2 and SR = 3. We use regression analysis to simulate the cash flows generated by the 
benchmark bank, and proxy  by taking the differences between these simulated cash 
flows and the ones observed for La Nef. 
Second, to compute , we rely on the results from Table 5 (specification (3)).28 We 
determine the loan-specific rebates on interest rates with respect to the SR = 1 benchmark. For 
each loan with SR = 2 and 3, we simulate the yearly interest payments forgone by the social 
bank over the duration of the loan and we add up their discounted values. Summing all the 
forgone payments in year t yields our estimation of . 
Third, the cost of social screening, , is hardest to assess. The burden associated with 
social screening translates into higher costs for at least two reasons: the bank’s time-
consuming screening technique and the geographic dispersion of the borrowers. Financially 
sustainable social projects are scarce. The bank is thus inclined to search for business 
opportunities all over the country. In addition, the borrower’s evaluation is systemically 
conducted on-site by a loan officer. Ultimately, 50.41% of the loans are extended to 
borrowers living in remote rural areas. To get a sense of the excess operating costs 
attributable to the search for and assessment of social projects, we compare the 80% operating 
ratio of La Nef to that of comparable French banks over the same period.29 We use data from 
La Nef’s annual reports and estimate  as the share of overhead expenses for screening 
operations dedicated to the social screening in year t.  
 
 
 
28
 We use specification (3) rather than specification (4) in order to carry out the analysis on the full sample.   
29
 For French banks, Gouteroux (2006) and Ory et al. (2006) obtain operating ratios of between 62.5% and 
68.5%. In this respect, La Nef undoubtedly represents an outlier. 
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Table 7: Yearly Net Benefits of Reciprocity (NBR)  
 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 Average 
  (€) 59,688.58 90,056.45 141,367.68 186,395.90 119,377.15 
! (€) 15,442.89 28,486.43 56,658.87 65,538.41 41,531.65 
" (€) 53,492.74 88,818.14 131,973.85 132,664.05 101,737.19 
#$%  (€) 
      - 9,247.06  - 27,248.12  - 47,265.04  - 11,806.55  - 23,891.69  
#&!  (€) 51,017.00 208,814.00 235,800.00 199,151.00 173,695.50 
#$%  / #&!  (%) - 18.13 - 13.05 - 20.04 - 5.93 - 14.29 
CDt is the year-t reduction in the cost of default driven by the virtuous repayment conduct of motivated borrowers. It is the 
year-t reduction in cashed-in interests stemming from social premiums offered to motivated borrowers. SCt represents the 
year-t screening costs associated with assessing the applicants’ social ratings. NBRt is the net benefit of reciprocity in year t. 
NOIt indicates the yearly net operating incomes of La Nef. 
 
Table 7 summarizes the results. Noticeably, all the estimated values of  are 
negative, in line with the evidence that investing in social banks entails financial sacrifices 
(Becchetti and Garcia, 2011; San-Jose et al., 2011). With reference with our theoretical model 
in Section 2, the figures reveal that the costs associated with social screening are high. 
Table 7 also indicates the yearly net operating incomes of La Nef, ' and the values 
of  scaled by ' The figures reveal that the bank’s social orientation has a significant 
cost amounting an average 14.29% of net operating income. However, this cost is not steady 
over time. 
We run sensitivity analyses with regard to two key parameters. First, we allow the 
discount rate–set at 6% in our estimations–to take a wide range of values. Our computations 
(not reported here) show that  is quite insensitive to a variation in the discount rate. For 
instance, with discount rates of 2% and 10%, the average  would represent 12.17% and 
16.7% of the average', respectively. Second, we investigate the impact of the share of 
overheads attributed to social screening. This share, estimated at 31.84% in Appendix B, is 
used to build a proxy for . Actually, the analysis reveals that –and hence –is 
sensitive the share of overheads attributed to social screening. More precisely, reciprocity is 

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costly (i.e. the average value of NBR is negative) as soon as the share lies above 24.36%. 
Determining whether this threshold is realistic remains an open question.  
More generally, our model shows that social banks have spillover effects on the whole 
economy since reciprocity permits the financing of low-risk, efficient projects. However, this 
positive impact has not been accounted for in the cost-benefit analysis, which is restricted to 
the bank’s perspective. 
 
7. Robustness Checks 
This section proposes robustness checks on the reciprocity effect detected in Tables 5 and 6. 
We run new regressions controlling for two groups of dummy variables neglected so far.30 
We include each set of variables separately to avoid potential multicollinearity. Additional 
checks are offered in Appendix C.  
The results are summarized in Table 8. In columns (1) to (4), we control for bank 
branches to reflect the diversity of the French regions. Moreover, the distance between the 
branches and La Nef’s headquarters varies. Distance could indeed matter in communicating 
soft information to the credit committee (Liberti and Mian, 2009).31 In columns (5) to (8), we 
take into account the borrower’s location (town, rural area or suburb). Location is a natural 
proxy for competition intensity. Banking competition is likely less fierce in remote rural areas 
or in suburbs than in cities endowed with abundant financial services. 
 
 
 
30
 The robustness checks are carried out on the reduced sample for which we have full information (367 firms). 
31
 Even though La Nef has several branches, it has a single nationwide credit committee. This committee is 
composed of two persons: a headquarters-based manager and the loan officer. Importantly, branch-based loan 
officers take active part in the committee’s decision making. They can communicate all the relevant soft 
information either by being on-site or by phone. Since the headquarters are located in the South-East branch, 
loan officers from that branch perhaps influence the credit conditions more than their colleagues from other 
branches. 


Table 8: Robustness Checks: Additional Dummies  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OLS Probita OLS Probita OLS Probita OLS Probita 
VARIABLES RATE DEFAULT RATE DEFAULT RATE DEFAULT RATE DEFAULT 
                
SR -0.14*** -0.09*** -0.08** -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.08** -0.09*** 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) 
FIN -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.12** -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.12** 
(0.046) (0.048) (0.045) (0.049) (0.046) (0.048) (0.045) (0.049) 
PIBOR3M 0.60*** 0.49*** 0.60*** 0.49*** 
(0.029) (0.090) (0.029) (0.090) 
STARTUP 0.03 0.12** 0.02 0.11** 0.02 0.13*** 0.02 0.11** 
(0.050) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) 
RELATIONSHIP 0.06 -0.09 0.02 -0.09 0.05 -0.08 0.02 -0.09 
(0.065) (0.060) (0.063) (0.058) (0.065) (0.062) (0.063) (0.059) 
RATE -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
LOAN SIZE -0.02*** -0.00 -0.02*** 0.00 -0.02*** 0.00 -0.02*** 0.00 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
NONCOLLAT -0.33** -0.01 -0.38** 0.06 -0.33** -0.02 -0.38** 0.06 
(0.155) (0.173) (0.153) (0.183) (0.157) (0.175) (0.154) (0.184) 
CONSTANT 5.00*** 5.14*** 4.95*** 5.08*** 
(0.153) (0.410) (0.154) (0.414) 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Loan officer dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Bank branch dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Borr. loc. dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 367 367 367 367 367 367 367 367 
R-squared 0.62 .  0.67 . 0.62 . 0.67 . 
Log (L) . -180.35 . -171.11 . -181.12 . -170.95 
a: The column reports marginal effects at the mean.  
*: significant at the 10% level, **: significant at the 5% level, ***: significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
Overall, Table 8 shows that the previous results resist the inclusion of all the dummies. 
Moreover, the influence of the refinancing rate (PIBOR3M) is not eliminated by the presence 
of these variables. This can be seen as confirmation that the bank smoothes interest rates in 
response to time variations in market rates.  
On the whole, the robustness checks confirm our previous findings on the impacts of 
social rating on both credit conditions and probability of default, respectively. Motivated 
firms benefit from advantageous interest rates and loan sizes from the social bank, and 
subsequently reimburse their loans more responsibly than regular firms, all else being equal. 

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8. Conclusion 
Social banks are committed to paying attention to non-financial outcomes of their 
investments. Their mission differs significantly from that of typical capitalistic banks. That 
they are able to accomplish this mission is due to the specific orientation of their stakeholders. 
As savers, cooperative members, or shareholders, social investors accept lower-than-market 
financial returns provided their money is channeled into social projects. However, this 
foundational principle imposes no clear-cut investment rules on the managers of social banks. 
As a consequence, it is worth studying how these institutions grant credit in practice.  
Based on a representative European case study, this paper examines how a social bank 
passes its investors’ financial sacrifices through to socially minded borrowers. Our empirical 
analysis delivers two key messages. First, we show that the sacrifices made by social 
investors result in rebates on the interest rates charged to borrowers aiming to fund profitable 
social projects. Well-run motivated firms are eventually able to decrease their cost of capital 
by borrowing from a social bank. Surprisingly, the growing literature on socially responsible 
investment is silent on this finding. Second, we document the existence of a reciprocity effect 
from motivated borrowers. While theoretical and experimental evidence has previously raised 
that possibility, this paper is the first–to our knowledge–to exhibit a real-life situation 
involving reciprocity in the banking industry. This innovative result offers promising grounds 
for further investigation of the features that enhance repayment performances. Relationship 
lending has long been recognized as a way to overcome moral hazard. But relationships take 
time to build, and evidently do not apply to start-ups, which are in dire need of funding 
opportunities. While reciprocity applies only to a specific segment of the banking industry, 
where investors and borrowers share common values, it may prove to be more efficient in 
practice.  

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Additionally, we show that the social bank is more concerned with increasing the 
probability of success of viable social projects rather than targeting projects otherwise 
redlined by commercial banks. Offering cheap credit to such projects likely entails lower 
financial sacrifices–in terms of both risk and expected returns–than funding below-break-even 
social projects. This strategy should imply that investing in social banks is safer but less 
profitable than in mainstream banks. Our results show that, despite the existence of 
reciprocity, social concern is costly to the bank studied in this paper. Further work could be 
done to assess the impact of social goals on risk-taking attitudes. 
By voluntarily restricting its activity to basic financial intermediation, social banking 
offers an attractive alternative to the “big bank” model undermined by the recent crisis. Is this 
a new model applicable to the industry as a whole or is it limited to double-bottom-line 
institutions? This is debatable. Indeed, social banks currently account for a limited segment of 
the banking industry, and their action affects the economy only marginally. Moreover, as 
observed in the microfinance industry, growth is sometimes associated with mission drift 
(Armendariz and Szafarz, 2011).  
It may also be wondered whether the development of social banking would crowd out 
standard borrowers from the credit market. In a hypothetical world where a significant portion 
of banks value social performances and total credit is rationed, the share of credit left to non-
social projects would shrink. However, this scenario is unrealistic in a profit-driven 
capitalistic economy. Moreover, social and non-social firms naturally belong to different 
economic sectors. Therefore, social banking hardly distorts competition mechanisms.  
The findings of this paper bring important but preliminary insights into the fast-growing 
industry of social banking. Working with a single institution inevitably restricts the external 
validity of our conclusions. While La Nef's operating method is fairly representative of 

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European social banks, further work is needed to assess the degree of generalization of our 
results. Features such as country of origin, legal status, size, age, and governance design 
might matter.  
Admittedly, like most studies concerned with explaining credit terms, our analysis is not 
immune from selection biases. First, we observe actual loans only and have no information on 
denied applications. Second, the social nature of the bank could drive a self-selection bias 
stemming from the applicants’ perception of the bank’s objectives. Third, in a dynamic 
perspective, firms with poor social and economic performances are likely washed out. 
Therefore, the reciprocity effect we detect could be partly attributable to a survival bias. 
While our theoretical model helps in addressing these arguments, further empirical work is 
still needed to disentangle the reciprocity effect from the reputation effect associated with 
relationship lending.  
Technically, building a social rating raises specific issues. In the bank under scrutiny in 
this paper, the social rating is meant to measure idiosyncratic characteristics, such as the 
borrower’s moral rectitude and social motivation, the ethicality of the core business, the 
corporate responsibility to stakeholders, environmental and social concerns, etc. The 
computation of this social rating does not abide by strict rules, and is therefore difficult to 
assess through a standardized procedure. It relies heavily on soft information, mainly 
collected by loan officers whose objectivity may be questioned (Agier and Szafarz, 2013b).32 
This new type of agency problem may compromise the fulfillment of the bank’s social 
mission. 
On the whole, this paper contributes to the understanding of the way social banks 
operate in the credit market, a topic largely overlooked in the literature so far. In particular, it 
 

 In other social banks, the social assessment is carried out according to distinct procedures. For example, in 
Banca Etica (Italy), a thorough social audit is conducted by the so-called “social auditors or experts”, who are 
cooperative members trained by the bank.   
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shows that the loans granted by social banks share characteristics both with commercial loans 
from mainstream banks and with subsidized credit from public institutions. This new and 
promising model of banking activity undoubtedly calls for further investigation.  
 
  
	

References  
 
Adbulkardiroglu, A. and K. Bagwell (2013), “Trust, Reciprocity, and Favors in Cooperative 
Relationships,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, 213-259. 
Agier, I. and A. Szafarz (2013a), “Microfinance and Gender: Is There a Glass Ceiling on 
Loan Size?” World Development 42, 165-181. 
Agier, I. and A. Szafarz (2013b), “Subjectivity in Credit Allocation to Micro-Entrepreneurs: 
Evidence from Brazil,” Small Business Economics 41, 263-275. 
Ahmed, A.S., C. Takeda and S. Thomas (1999), ”Bank Loan Loss Provisions: A 
Reexamination of Capital Management, Earnings Management and Signaling Effects,” 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 28, 1-25.  
Akerlof, G.A. and R.E. Kranton (2000), “Economics and Identity,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115, 715-733. 
Akerlof, G.A. and R.E. Kranton (2005), “Identity and the Economics of Organizations,” 
Journal of Economic Perspective 19, 9-32.   
Allet, M. and M. Hudon (2013), “Green Microfinance. Characteristics of Microfinance 
Institutions Involved in Environmental Management,” CEB Working Paper No 13/005, 
Université Libre de Bruxelles. 
Armendariz, B. and J. Morduch (2010), The Economics of Microfinance, Second Edition, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Armendariz, B. and A. Szafarz (2011), “On Mission Drift in Microfinance Institutions,” in: 
Armendariz, B. and M. Labie (Eds), The Handbook of Microfinance, London - 
Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 341-366. 
Banque Populaire de l’Ouest (2010), Annual Report.  
Barigozzi, F. and P. Tedeschi (2011), “Credit Markets with Ethical Banks and Motivated 
Borrowers,” Working Paper DSE No 786, University of Bologna.  
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001), The New Basel Capital Accord. 
Consultative Document. 
Becchetti, L. and M. Garcia (2011), “Do Collateral Theories Work in Social Banking?” 
Applied Financial Economics 21, 931-947. 
Becchetti, L., M. Garcia and G. Trovato (2011), “Credit Rationing and Credit View: 
Empirical Evidence from Loan Data,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 43, 1217-
1245. 
A

Becchetti, L. and B. Huybrechts (2008), “The Dynamics of Fair Trade as a Mixed-Form 
Market,” Journal of Business Ethics 81, 733-750. 
Benabou, R. and J. Tirole (2010), “Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility,” 
Economica 77, 1-19. 
Benedikter, R. (2011), Social Banking and Social Finance, New York: Springer. 
Berger, A.N. and G.F. Udell (1995), “Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm 
Finance,” Journal of Business 68, 351-381. 
Berger, A.N., R.J. Rosen and G.F. Udell (2007), “Does Market Size Structure Affect 
Competition: The Case of Small Business Lending,” Journal of Banking & Finance 31, 
11-33. 
Boot, A.W.A. (2000), “Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?” Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 9, 7-25. 
Brown, M., E. Fehr and C. Zehnder (2009), “Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract 
Enforcement and Price Rigidity,” Economic Journal 111, 333-353.  
Brown, M. and C. Zehnder (2007), “Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking and Loan 
Repayment,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39, 1883-1918.  
Chakraborty, A. and C. Hu (2006), “Lending Relationships in Line-of-Credit and Non-Line-
of-Credit Loans: Evidence from Collateral Use in Small Business,” Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 15, 86-107. 
Chen, Y. and S.X. Li (2009), “Group Identity and Social Preferences,” American Economic 
Review 99, 431-457. 
Cornée, S., D. Masclet, and G. Thenet (2012), “Credit Relationships: Evidence from 
Experiments with Real Bankers,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 44, 957-980. 
Cowan, C.D. and A.M. Cowan (2006), “A Survey Based Assessment of Financial Institution 
Use of Credit Scoring for Small Business Lending,” Office of Advocacy, US Small 
Business Administration.  
Cowton, C.J. (2002), “Integrity, Responsibility and Affinity: Three Aspects of Ethics in 
Banking,” Business Ethics: A European Review 11, 393-400.   
Cowton, C. and P. Thomspon (2000), “Do Codes Make a Difference? The Case of Bank 
Lending and the Environment,” Journal of Business Ethics 24, 165-178.  
Crédit Agricole Ille-et-Vilaine (2010), Annual Report.  
Crédit Mutuel Arkéa (2011), Annual Report.  
B

Defourny, J. (2001), “From Third Sector to Social Enterprise,” in: Borzaga, C. and J. 
Defourny (Eds), The Emergence of Social Enterprise, London - New York: Routledge, 1-
18. 
Degryse, H. and P. Cayseele (2000), “Relationship Lending within a Bank-Based System: 
Evidence from European Small Business Data,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 9, 
90-109. 
Dufwenberg, M. and G. Kirchsteiger (2004), “A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity,” Games 
and Economic Behavior 47, 268-298. 
Elsas, R. and J.P. Krahnen (1998), “Is Relationship Lending Special? Evidence from Credit-
File Data in Germany?” Journal of Banking & Finance 22, 1283-1316.  
Fehr, E. and U. Fischbacher (2002), “Why Social Preferences Matter – The Impact of Non- 
Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives,” Economic Journal 112, 1-
33.  
Fehr, E., S. Gächter, and G. Kirchsteiger (1997), “Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement 
Device: Experimental Evidence,” Econometrica 65, 833-860. 
Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt (1999), “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817-868. 
Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt (2003), “Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and 
Economic Applications,” in M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky (Eds.), 
Advances in Economics and Econometrics - 8th World Congress, Econometric Society 
Monographs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fehr, E. and C. Zehnder (2006), “Reputation and Credit Market Formation,” FINRISK 
Working Paper, University of Zurich.  
Ferri, G., P. Kalmi and E. Kerola (2010), “Organizational Structure and Performance in 
European Banks: A Reassessment,” Paper prepared for the EURICSE Conference 
“Financial Co-operative Approaches to Local Development through Sustainable 
Innovation”. 
GABV (Global Alliance for Banking on Value) (2012), Full Report, http://www.gabv.org/wp-
content/uploads/Full-Report-GABV-v9d.pdf.   
Gächter, S. and Falk, A. (2002), “Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour 
Relation,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 104, 1-27. 
Global Report Initiative (2011), Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, version 3.1.  
www.globalreporting.org.  


Gouteroux, C. (2006) “Le système bancaire et financier français en 2005,” Bulletin de la 
Banque de France 151, 75-85. 
Green, C.F. (1989), “Business Ethics in Banking,” Journal of Business Ethics 8, 631-634. 
Grunert, J., L. Norden and M. Weber (2005), “The Role of Non-Financial Factors in Internal 
Credit Ratings,” Journal of Banking & Finance 29, 509-531. 
Gutiérrez-Nieto, B., C. Serrano-Cinca, and J. Camón-Cala (2011), “A Credit Score System 
for Socially Responsible Lending,” CEB Working Paper No 11/028, Université Libre de 
Bruxelles. 
Hudon, M. (2007), “Fair Interest Rates when Lending to the Poor,” Ethics and Economics 5, 
1-8. 
Iannotta, G., G. Nocera, and A. Sironi (2007), “Ownership Structure, Risk and Performance 
in the European Banking Industry,” Journal of Banking & Finance 31, 2127-2149. 
Jaffee, D. M. and T. Russell (1976), “Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit 
Rationing,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, 651-66. 
Karlan D. (2005), “Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict 
Financial Decisions,” American Economic Review 95, 1688-1699. 
Kitson, A. (1996), “Taking the Pulse: Ethics and the British Cooperative Bank,” Journal of 
Business Ethics 15, 1021-1031.  
La Nef (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2010), Annual Reports. 
Liberti, J. and A. Mian (2009), “Estimating the Effect of Hierarchies on Information Use,” 
Review of Financial Studies 22, 4057-4090. 
Machauer, A. and M. Weber (1998), “Bank Behavior Based on Internal Credit Ratings of 
Borrowers,” Journal of Banking & Finance 22, 1355-1383. 
McLeish, K.J. and R.J. Oxoby (2011), “Social Interactions and the Salience of Social 
Identity,” Journal of Economic Psychology 32, 172-178.  
Ory, Jean-Noël, M. Jaeger and E. Gurtner (2006) “La banque à forme coopérative peut-elle 
soutenir durablement la compétition avec la banque SA ? ” Finance Contrôle Stratégie 9, 
121-157.  
Norman, W. and C. MacDonald (2004) “Getting to the Bottom of ‘Triple Bottom Line,’” 
Business Ethics Quarterly 14, 243-262. 
Petersen, M. and R. Rajan (1994), “The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from 
Small Business Data,” Journal of Finance 49, 3-37. 


Périlleux, A., M. Hudon, and E. Bloy (2012), “Surplus distribution in Microfinance: 
Differences among Cooperatives, Nonprofit, and Shareholder Forms of Ownership,” 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 41, 386-404. 
Rabin, M. (1993), “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,” American 
Economic Review 83, 1281-1302. 
Robert de Massy, O. and G. Lhomme (2008), “Les nouvelles frontières de la formation 
bancaire,” Revue d’Economie Financière 92, 229-243.  
San-Jose, L., J.L. Retolaza, and J. Gutierrez (2011), “Are Ethical Banks Different? A 
Comparative Analysis Using the Radical Affinity Index,” Journal of Business Ethics 100, 
151-173.  
Scholtens, B. (2006), “Finance as a Driver of Corporate Social Responsibility,” Journal of 
Business Ethics 68, 19-31. 
Stiglitz, J. and A. Weiss (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,” 
American Economic Review 71, 393-410.   
Taupin, M.T. and P. Glémain (2007), “ Les logiques d’acteurs des finances solidaires 
contemporaines : Entre innovation et résilience,” Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics 78, 629-661. 
Uzzi, B. (1999), “Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social Relations 
and Networks Benefit Firms Seeking Financing,” American Sociological Review 64, 
481-505. 
Weber, O. and S. Remer (2011), Social Banks and the Future of Sustainable Finance, London 
- New York: Routledge.   
  


APPENDIX A: La Nef’s Organizational Characteristics 
 
Table A1: Geographic Breakdown of the Loans Granted by La Nef (2001-2004)  

Notes: Over the study period, the regional remit of some branches has changed. When this is the case, we have 
favored the branch in charge of the region for the longest period. Due to data unavailability, the figures are 
computed on a sub-sample of 367 borrowers.  
  
Bank 
Branch Metropolitan regions Loans 
SOUTH 
EAST 
Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur 53 
Rhône-Alpes 38 
Bourgogne 6 
Alsace 0 
Corse 0 
Franche-Comté 5 
Auvergne 8 
Languedoc 9 
 
Total 119 
PARIS, 
NORTH 
WEST 
Basse-Normandie 43 
Bretagne 28 
Centre 7 
Champagne 2 
Haute-Normandie 7 
Ile-de-France 86 
Lorraine 5 
Nord 2 
Pays-de-la-Loire 15 
Picardie 3 
Total 198 
SOUTH 
WEST 
Aquitaine 6 
Midi-Pyrénées 27 
Limousin 7 
Poitou-Charente 10 
Total 50 
Grand total 367 
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Appendix B: Technicalities in the Cost-Benefit Analysis of Reciprocity 
Here we report the detailed computation of three components of NBR in Eq. (3). 
1) Computation of   
La Nef is committed to report loan-disaggregated LLPs to the French banking authority on a 
quarterly basis. We managed to gain access to the report released in the first quarter of 2007 
(this also gives the level of provisioning for the last quarter of 2006), while our sample period 
ends in November 2008. As a result, we have detailed information on LLPs for 65 loans out 
of the 91 defaulted loans in our sample (i.e. 71.4%). We have estimated the missing LLPs by 
multiplying the respective loan sizes by the average provisioning rate computed from the 
observable LLPs. This average rate is 27.54%.33 One could object that LLPs are adjusted over 
time in reaction to changes in default expectations. In practice, however, the adjustments 
prove to be limited. Between the last quarter of 2006 and the first quarter of 2007, the average 
LLP adjustment was 2.58% only. Therefore, we consider that the missing one-year 
adjustment does not affect  much. Last, we discounted all the LLPs according to the year 
of default.  
To measure how reciprocity reduces the cost of default, we run a Tobit regression (see 
Table B1). The explained variable is the present value of LLPs for defaulted loans, and 0 
otherwise. The explanatory variable of interest is SR. We also include control variables 
accounting for contractual features, financial risk characteristics, and relational aspects. The 
marginal effects reported in Column (2) indicate that the present value of LLP decreases by 
€1,047.72 per unit of SR. In this way, we obtain the differential LLPs driven by each actual 
loan with SR = 2 or 3. Summing up, we obtain an estimate of the total benefit attributable to 
the reduction in yearly default occurrences. 
 
33
 The provisioning rate of a loan in default is equal to LLP / loan size. 
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Table B1: Tobit Regression for LLP (discount rate = 6%) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES LLP Marg. Effects 
      
SR -4,855.54** -1,047.17** 
(2,033.055) (432.960) 
FIN -8,717.91*** -1,880.14*** 
(3,216.189) (680.200) 
STARTUP 8,953.55*** 1,928.87*** 
(3,225.034) (696.110) 
RELATIONSHIP -4,881.30 -1,004.81 
(4,806.737) (939.300) 
RATE 597.75 128.91 
(3,475.278) (749.520) 
LOANSIZE 0.08** 0.01** 
(0.035) (0.007) 
NONCOLLAT 7,589.73 1,636.83 
(9,958.397) (2,147.300) 
CONSTANT -5,041.89 
(26,374.540) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 389 389 
Log (L) -1,112.27 . 
 
 
2) Computation of !  
We compute the differential in cashed-in interests as follows. For each loan in our sample, we 
compare two situations: The actual one and its “SR = 1” simulated counterpart. The aim is to 
compute the discounted cashed-in interests for the two situations, and then take the difference 
between them. To simplify the computations, we work out annual installment (constant 
annuities) even though borrowers repay in monthly installments. 
Table B2 depicts an example. The 5-year loan amounts €50,000. The actual interest 
charged by the bank on this loan is 5% and the actual social rating is 3. From Table 5 
(Specification (3)), we find that the simulated counterpart of the loan bears interest at 5.30%. 
Table 5 extracts the annual interest paid on both loans (5% and 5.30%). Annual differences 
are then computed and discounted at a 6% rate. The final result is the sum of these figures, i.e. 
€418.05. Similar calculations are conducted for all the loans in our sample.  
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Table B2: Difference in Cashed-in Interests: An Example (loan size = € 50,000; SR = 3)  
Year  
1 2 3 4 5  
Actual interests paid 
(r = 5%) 2,500.00 2,047.56 1,572.50 1,073.69 549.94  
Simulated interests  
if SR = 1 
(r = 5.30%) 
2,650.00 2,173.28 1,671.30 1,142.71 586.10  
Difference in cashed-in 
interests 150.00 125.72 98.80 69.02 36.16 Total 
Discounted difference in 
cashed-in interests 141.51 111.89 82.95 54.67 27.02 418.05 
 
 
3) Computation of "  
Loan officers represent the main cost drivers of screening costs. To evaluate the proportion of 
the extra cost dedicated to social screening, we gauge the productivity of La Nef’s loan 
officers compared with that of loan officers in non-social banks dealing with the same type of 
borrowers (i.e. small-and-medium-sized enterprises, henceforth SMEs). The productivity of a 
loan officer is proxied by the number of loans she grants annually. Informal contacts with La 
Nef's managers have revealed that, according to their standard, a full-time loan officer grants 
25 loans annually. In comparable non-social banks, we have estimated this load to be 36.67.34 
We therefore attribute 31.84% of the workload of loan officers in La Nef to social screening.  
We use the conservative assumption that the screening operation overheads (SCO) are 
fully captured by the operational costs associated with loan officers, including wages. To 
determine those costs, we proceed as follows (see Table B3). First, we extract from La Nef’s 
 
34
 To obtain this figure, we have combined two sources of information. First, Robert de Massy and Lhomme 
(2008), mention that on average 15.97% of total staff in French banks are devoted to the screening of SME loan 
applicants. Second, from annual reports (2010 annual report of Banque Populaire de l’Ouest, 2010 annual report 
of Crédit Agricole Ille-et-Vilaine, and 2011 annual report of Crédit Mutuel Arkéa) of regional branches of the 
three major French cooperative banks dealing with SMEs we estimate their numbers of SME loans per officer: 
41.09, 35.25 and 33.68 for Banque Populaire de l’Ouest, Crédit Agricole Ille-et-Vilaine, and Crédit Mutuel 
Arkéa, respectively. Averaging these figures yields 36.67 loans granted per officer per year. This computation is 
somewhat heroic since the activity sector, the type of clientele, and the lending technology should be held 
constant. 
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annual reports the yearly overhead expenses incurred by all the bank’s operations, the yearly 
full staff sizes, and the yearly numbers of active loan officers (La Nef, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 
2004). Second, we compute the year-t average cost per staff member by dividing the overhead 
expenses in year t by the number of full-time staff members active during year t. Third, we 
derive the year-t SCO by multiplying the number of full-time loan officers active in year t by 
the year-t average cost per staff member. The SCOs include both financial and social 
screening costs but exclude those associated with back-office personnel. Last, to estimate , 
we multiply the year-t SCO by the 31.84% factor representing the excess workload of loan 
officers due to social screening.  
Table B3: Computation of "   
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Average cost per staff member 68,041.96 75,066.67 79,937.50 81,128.21 
Full-time loan officers 2.47 3.72 5.19 5.14 
Screening operation overheads (SCO) 168,004.83 278,951.44 414,490.74 416,658.44 
= 31.84% * SCO 53,492.74 88,181.14 131,973.85 132,664.05 
  
	
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Appendix C: Additional Robustness Checks 
We carry out four additional robustness checks on the full sample. First, Table C1 gives the 
results from the multivariate estimation of specification (2) in Table 5. It is based on reduced-
form estimation. In this way, we assess the impacts of loan characteristics on credit 
conditions, while avoiding potential endogeneity biases.  
Table C1: Robustness Check: Multivariate Regression for the Credit Conditions  
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES RATE LOANSIZE NONCOLLAT 
        
SR -0.15*** 0.90*** 0.01 
 
(0.032) (0.325) (0.011) 
FIN -0.15*** -0.03 -0.02 
 
(0.048) (0.483) (0.017) 
PIBOR3M 0.61*** -0.83*** -0.04*** 
 
(0.029) (0.295) (0.010) 
STARTUP 0.03 -2.13*** 0.03* 
 
(0.050) (0.500) (0.017) 
RELATIONSHIP -0.02 -0.72 0.04* 
 
(0.066) (0.661) (0.023) 
CONSTANT 4.84*** 6.17*** 0.25*** 
(0.148) (1.489) (0.051) 
Observations 389 389 389 
R-squared 0.57 0.10 0.06 
*: significant at the 10% level, **: significant at the 5% level, ***: significant at the 1% level. 
 
Overall, the figures in the first column of Table C1 confirm those in Table 5 regarding 
the impact of the social rating on interest rates. R-squares indicate that the adjustment is poor 
for the other credit conditions. This can be attributed to two factors. First, loan size alone is a 
loose indicator of credit rationing. Its determination is most likely influenced by the requested 
amount, which is unobservable. Second, collateralization for start-ups is highly dependent on 
public guarantees, which are also unobservable. Both limitations might create missing-
variable distortions in the estimations of loan size and collateralization. Nevertheless, 
reduced-form estimation has the merit of freeing the interest rate loadings from these 
distortions.  
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Table C2: Robustness Check: Alternative Specifications for Social Rating 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Ordered 
Probita OLS  Probita OLS  Probita 
VARIABLES SR RATE DEFAULT RATE DEFAULT 
    
PSR   -0.13*** -0.09***   
  (0.032) (0.029)   
DICSR -0.15** -0.14** 
(0.059) (0.061) 
FIN 0.10 -0.16*** -0.13*** 0.16*** -0.12*** 
(0.122) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) 
PIBOR3M   0.59*** 0.59***  
  (0.030) (0.030)  
STARTUP -0.45*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.01 0.14 
(0.123) (0.050) (0.046) (0.051) (0.047) 
RELATIONSHIP 0.19 -0.04 -0.10* -0.03 -0.10 
(0.167) (0.065) (0.05) (0.066) (0.057) 
RATE   -0.02  -0.01 
  (0.034)  (0.034) 
LOANSIZE   -0.02*** 0.00 
 
0.02** 0.00 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
NONCOLLAT -0.15 -0.01 -0.17 -0.01 
  (0.146) (0.154) (0.147) (0.153) 
CONSTANT   4.70*** 4.81***  
  (0.136) (0.145)  
Cut 1 -0.89***   
(0.257)   
Cut 2 0.38   
(0.254)   
Observations 389 389 389 389 389 
R-squared  . 0.57 . 0.57 . 
Log (L) -394.74 . -194.14 . -193.29 
a: The column reports marginal effects at the mean.  
*: significant at the 10% level, **: significant at the 5% level, ***: significant at the 1% level. 
 
Second, in Table C2 we propose two alternative specifications for the measurement of 
the social rating. First, we use two-step estimations to clean the social rating of its interactions 
with other loan characteristics. In column (1), an ordered probit regression model extracts the 
residuals of SR when regressed on FIN, STARTUP, and RELATIONSHIP. These residuals 
constitute “pure” social ratings (PSR). Only the start-up dummy is significant in the first-path 
regression. Then, the interest rate (column (2)) is estimated by substituting PSR for SR. The 
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empirical results prove to be robust to this change. The negative impact of PSR on the 
probability of default (column (3)) is the same as that of SR in Table 6. We thus exclude any 
spurious effect due to accidental correlations between the social rating and other loan 
characteristics. Second, in columns (4) and (5), we dichotomize the social rating and use 
variable DICSR, which takes value 0 if SR = 1, and 1 when SR > 1. The aim is to limit the 
impact of the ordinality of the SR rating. According the La Nef’s criterion, DICSR = 1 
indicates that the projects have at least one social or environmental component. Except for the 
significance level, which passes from 1% to 5%, dichotomizing the social rating does not 
modify the previous results. The negative impact of DICSR on the probability of default 
(column (5)) is even stronger than that of SR in Table 6. Altogether, Table C2 not only 
confirms our previous results, they also emphasize that our findings are driven by purely 
social motives. 
Third, we run instrumental-variable estimation to account for the possibility of SR 
being endogenous. The results (not reported here) show that the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis that SR is exogenous (p = 0.6584).35  
Fourth, Table C3 proposes two specifications including additional explanatory 
variables. Columns (1) and (2) in Table C3 examine whether the impact of the social ratings 
is partly attributable to loan size. The descriptive statistics in Section 3 pointed out that 
borrowers with higher social ratings tend to receive larger loans. In fact, we checked the 
potential effect of loan size in two ways. First, we estimated the two equations (for rate and 
default) on a censored sample obtained by excluding the largest loans. Several cut-off points 
 
35
 We used the following instrumental variables: ENVIRONMENT (dummy variable taking value 1 if the 
borrowing firm works in the environmental sector, and zero otherwise), RURAL (dummy variable taking value 1 
if the borrowing firm is located in a rural area, and zero otherwise), NONPROF (dummy variable taking value 1 
if the borrowing firm is a not-for-profit organization, and zero otherwise), UNLIMITED (dummy variable taking 
value 1 if the borrowing firm is an unlimited company, and zero otherwise), CONSORTIUM (dummy variable 
taking value 1 if the borrowing firm belongs to a consortium, and zero otherwise), and the duplicates 
(STARTUP and RELATIONSHIP). 
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were used (results not reported). All of them produced results consistent with those from our 
baseline regressions. Second, we added the interaction between loan size and social rating 
among the explanatory variables. Table C3 reveals that the loadings of this interaction term in 
our two regressions of interest are insignificant. Loan size does not interfere with the 
reciprocity effect.  
 
Table C3: Robustness Check: Additional Explanatory Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS Probita OLS Probita 
VARIABLES RATE DEFAULT RATE DEFAULT 
          
SR -0.16*** -0.08** -0.13*** -0.08** 
(0.045) (0.043) (0.031) (0.030) 
FIN -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.16*** -0.12*** 
(0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048) 
PIBOR3M 0.59*** 0.59***  
(0.030) (0.028)  
STARTUP -0.01 0.13*** 0.06 0.02 
(0.050) (0.047) (0.055) (0.055) 
RELATIONSHIP -0.02 -0.10 0.03 -0.07 
(0.065) (0.056) (0.064) (0.061) 
RATE -0.02  -0.00 
(0.034)  (0.036) 
LOANSIZE -0.04* 0.00 -0.02* 0.00 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.005) 
NONCOLLAT -0.14 -0.015 -0.34 -0.06 
(0.147) (0.155) (0.154) (0.155) 
SR*LOANSIZE 0.01 -0.00   
(0.008) (0.007)   
PUBLIC COLLAT -0.08 0.21*** 
(0.05) (0.055) 
CONSTANT 5.06*** 5.06***  
(0.174) (0.174)  
Observations 389 389 367 367 
R-squared 0.59 .  0.61  . 
Log (L) . -191.09 . -173.14 
a: The column reports marginal effects at the mean.  
*: significant at the 10% level, **: significant at the 5% level, ***: significant at the 1% level. 
 
As explained in Section 3, some loans, especially those made to start-ups, benefit from 
public collateral. The subsequent incentive may affect the bank’s lending behavior. We 
investigate this possibility in columns (3) and (4) in Table C3 by including the dummy 
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variable PUBLIC COLLAT (equal to 1 if the loan benefits from public collateral, and 0 
otherwise). The regression results show that public collateral has a significantly negative 
impact on the probability of default. Meanwhile, the STARTUP dummy loses significance, 
which might indicate the presence of multicollinearity between STARTUP and PUBLIC 
COLLAT. In any case, the impacts of our variables of interest, SR and FIN, remain consistent 
with those obtained from our baseline regressions. 
